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 Abstract 
Real life implies that public procurement contracting of renewable resources 
results in repeated interaction between a principal and the agents. The present 
paper analyses ratchet effects in contracting of renewable resources and how the 
presence of a resource constraint alters the “standard” ratchet effect result. We 
use a linear reward scheme to influence the incentives of the agents. It is shown 
that for some renewable resources we might end up both with more or with less 
pooling in the first-period compared to a situation without a resource constraint. 
The reason is that the resource constraint implies a smaller performance de-
pendent bonus, which reduces the first-period cost from concealing information 
but at the same time the resource constraint may also imply that second-period 
benefits from this concealment for the efficient agent are reduced. In situations 
with high likelihood of first-period pooling, the appropriateness of applying lin-
ear incentive schemes can be questioned. 
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Contracting is common in renewable resource management. In Denmark, pri-
vate forest owners franchise, for example, hunting to private explorers. In Can-
ada, while the public owned forests are franchised to private users in Canada. 
For non-renewable resources a normal result in a static model in contract theory 
under private information is that the most efficient agent must be allowed the 
same level of effort as under full information. Jensen and Vestergaard (2002a) 
show that this result does not hold for a renewable resource in a static model. 
For a renewable resource the most efficient agent must be allowed a larger ef-
fort than under full information to fulfil the resource restriction. 
 
In reality public procurement contracting has an inherently dynamic structure. 
The principal (a public agency) and the agents (the firms), between which con-
tracts for the production of goods or services are made, often interact repeat-
edly. In this course of interaction, the principal might be able to extract vulner-
able information about the characteristics of the agent, which makes it possible 
to re-design a contract so to increase the utility of the principal (i.e. social wel-
fare). For example, if the agent initially has private information, the principal 
must accept a certain level of information rent if he faces an efficient agent in 
an adverse selection situation. However, over time the principal repeatedly ob-
serves the agents behaviour and may, thereby, be able to deduce something 
about the agents private information. This again may make it possible for the 
principal to revise contracts so as to capture some or all of the initial informa-
tion rent. On the other hand, if the agent realizes this, he may adjust his behav-
iour so as to reduce the probability of the principal learning his private informa-
tion. The agent will have an incentive to conceal his private information, and so 




7The ratchet effect has been modelled by a number of researchers (see e.g. 
Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole, 1985 for an early contribution)
1 using contract-
ing setups with standard production technologies (i.e. public works, production 
of day care services, health care etc.). However, in some cases contracting 
situations involve exploitation of publicly owned renewable resources (like e.g. 
hunting or timber cutting in public forests, publicly owned ground or surface 
water resources etc.). Renewable resource problems are inherently dynamic be-
cause extraction in one period affects the extraction in the following periods 
and because the growth in the stock in the next period is partly determined by 
the extraction in this period. Therefore, standard ratcheting results may not ap-
ply and it even seems that the correct understanding of the dynamics of con-
tracting under asymmetric information could be especially important for opti-
mal design contract in renewable resource settings. Though much effort has 
been devoted to analysing optimal extraction paths over time for renewable re-
sources (see e.g. the studies of optimal forests and ground water exploitation 
paths by Hanley et al., 1997 and Field, 2000 respectively) and renewable re-
source contracting has been studied (see e.g. Jensen and Vestergaard, 2002a) 
the implications of ratcheting have, to our knowledge, not been studied in a re-
newable resource context before. 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the implications of the ratchet effect for pub-
lic renewable resources contracting.
2 This is done in a model of a publicly 
owned renewable resource where exploitation is subcontracted to a private firm 
(the agent) that has private information about its own exploitation costs. The 
principal (the public authority) use a linear reward scheme. The model consid-
ers two periods where the principal can revise a reward scheme between the 
first- and second-period to affect harvest paths on the basis of the observed re-
                                                           
1  Other studies include Zou (1989), Richardson (1989), Dillén and Lundholm (1996) and Ort-
mann and Squire (2000). 
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2  In order to verify that short-term contracts are relevant for renewable resources we can imagine 
a principal that sets a total limit for harvest from a forest for a year. This total harvest can be al-
located to agents as harvest within short-time periods (rations). The ration distributed to an 
agent can be changed during the year due to random variations in the stock of trees. Thus, con-
tracts are relevant for managing renewable resources. sult in the first-period. Our model is an extension of the original analysis by 
Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985) who show that a ratchet effect for a stan-
dard production technology implies that the principal should be more “gener-
ous” in a dynamic context in order to obtain information. We analyse two types 
of renewable resources. For some resources, costs are independent of the stock 
of the resource (for example timber cutting). The result from Freixas, Guesnerie 
and Tirole (1985) generalises to this case. For other resources costs depend on 
the stock of the resource (for example hunting and groundwater). The basic 
finding in this case is that the presence of a resource constraint might imply 
both more or less pooling in the first-period for some renewable resources, 
compared to a situation without a resource constraint. The reason for this result 
is that the resource constraint implies a smaller performance dependent bonus, 
which reduces the first-period cost from concealing information, but that the 
resource restriction may also reduce second-period benefits from this conceal-
ment for the efficient agent. The result that the likelihood of first-period pooling 
might be high is a serious problem for applying linear incentive schemes for 
renewable resources with stock-dependent costs. 
 
Jensen and Vestergaard (2002a) analyse a fishery where the principal collects 
the revenue from the fishery while the agents (fishermen) bear the costs but re-
ceive a subsidy. However, the most commonly used contract within fisheries is 
individual quotas (IQs). With IQs the agents bear the costs and collect the reve-
nue from extraction of the fisheries resource. However, timber cutting, hunting 
and groundwater are examples of renewable resources where public ownership 
occurs in many countries and, therefore, the analysis in Jensen and Vestergaard 
(2002a) is relevant for these renewable resources. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section the general model is pre-
sented and the basis for the ratchet effect is analysed. Section 3 is devoted to a 
static analysis of the implications of using a linear incentive scheme for the 
regulation of renewable resources under asymmetric information, while section 
4 expands the analysis to interaction in a dynamic context (ratchet effects). Sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper. 
 
92.  Model and basic incentives 
First we present the basic set-up for a renewable resource contracting situation 
very generally. This set-up constitutes the basis for the analysis in section 3 and 
4. The renewable resource can cover any hunting situation and timber cutting. 
We assume a fixed price, p, on the harvest from the renewable resource and 
there are a number of agents indexed i } ,..., 2 , 1 { n I = ∈ who extract from the renew-
able resource. 
 
Following Jensen and Vestergaard (2002a) we assume that the principal collects 
the revenue from harvesting the resource while extractors bear the costs. In or-
der to secure exploitation of the resource the principal pays a linear subsidy to 
the agents given by T . The static profit function of agent i, which is 
equal to agents i’s objective function is, therefore, given by: 
i i i bS a S + = ) (
) ,x i ( ) , ( S C bS a x S i i i i − + = π , where Si is agent i’s extraction, x is the stock of the 
renewable resource and Ci (Si, x) is a cost function which depends on individual 
extractions and stock size.
3 Following Neher (1990), standard assumption on 



























C , for 
all i, Si and x (all the following assumptions are valid for all i, Si and x). The 
profit function implies that the agent maximises the profit in each period and 
disregards resource conservation measures. The implication of this is that each 
individual extractor disregards the effect that his harvest has on other extractors 
and, thereby, an externality arises (see Clark (1990)). This externality is often 
labelled the stock externality (see Anderson (1986)). 
 
We assume that the agent is privately informed about a relevant parameter in 
the cost function. Basically, we assume a Bayesian environment, where all un-
certainty is captured by a single parameter θ ∈{L, H}. θ is the type of an agent 
and θ = L denotes a low cost agent, while θ = H is a high cost agent. Formally, 
let  ) , , ( θ x S C i i  be the cost function with  < . The realization of  ) , , ( L x S C i i ) , , ( H x S C i i
                                                           
 
10
3  The only restriction on Si and x is that they are non-negative. θ at the beginning of the principal-agent relationship is private information to 
each agent, while everything else is common knowledge. The principal has a 
common assessment of the likelihood of types, denoted as v for the probability 
of low cost type and (1-v) as the probability of high cost type. To get more 
structure on the types, we assume that 
x
L x S C
x





∂ ) , , ( ) , , ( . Furthermore, it is 
assumed that the single crossing property is fulfilled implying that 
ii ii
ii





. Define  ) (θ i S  as the extraction level of agent i, given 
the type is θ. In what follows it will be easier to assume, as done in most princi-
pal-agent relationships, that the principal faces one representative agent, which 
with probability v has low costs and with probability (1-v) has high costs. In 
this case, the expected (ex ante) extraction level is given by 
)) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ( H S L S n S i i ν ν − + =
S x F = ) (




Since we are analysing a renewable resource problem, we have to consider how 
it is renewed. Following standard assumptions in the renewable resource litera-
ture (see Conrad and Clark, 1987) define F(x) as the natural growth rate. For 
renewable resources it is normally assumed that F´(x) > 0 for x < xmsy and F´(x) 
< 0 for x > xmsy, where xmsy is the maximal sustainable yield. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that F´´(x) < 0.
4 A resource restriction is now formulated (see Neher, 
1990). This restriction implies that the change in stock sizes between time peri-
ods is equal to the natural growth rate minus the expected harvest. Following 
Jensen and Vestergaard (2002a) attention is restricted to steady-state equilib-
rium in this paper. Steady-state implies that the change in stock size between 
time periods is zero and, therefore, the resource restriction can be formulated as 
.
5 
4  See Conrad and Clark (1987) for an explanation of these assumptions. 
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5  A short discussion about how we interpret the intertemporal nature of regulation is useful. On 
the one hand, we assume that two periods exist, and at the same time we assume that in both 
periods, the renewable resource extraction is in a steady-state. If, i.e. in the first-period, infor-
mation is fully revealed the regulation is changed, and the economy moves to another steady-
state in the second-period. We do not model the adjustment to another steady-state, but for 
simplicity assume that the jump from one steady-state equilibrium to another happens instanta-The principal wants to maximise the expected welfare from exploiting the re-
source. Following Jensen and Vestergaard (2002a) expected welfare is defined 
as the expected long-run economic yield from harvesting the renewable re-
source.
6 Let SL and SH denote the extraction of the agent when he has low and 
high cost, respectively.
7 The problem the principal faces has three types of con-
straints. First, all agents must be given incentives to participate (the participa-
tion constraints denoted PC
θ). Second, each type must be given incentives to 
choose the allocation designed for this type (the incentive compatibility con-
straints denoted IC
θ). Finally, the principal must keep the resource in a long run 
steady state equilibrium (the resource constraint denoted RC). The principal’s 
problem is given by: 
 





Max W v( pS C(S ,x) (a bS )) (1 v)( pS C(S ,x) (a bS ))
s.t.
(S ,L) (S ,L)          
(S ,H ) (S ,H )        
(S ,L) 0                      
(S ,H ) 0                    

























where λ > 0 is the cost of public funds.
8 
 
                                                           
neously. Note, however, that the results in the paper generalise to the case where adjustments 
towards steady-states are included. The only difference that arises when adjustments towards 
steady-state is possible is that the recommended regulation changes in every time period re-
flecting the adjustment paths towards a new steady-state equilibrium (see Sandal and Stein-
shamn, 1997). The assumption about steady-state is useful as the analysis is less complex with 
this assumption. 
6  By maximising long-run economic yield discounting of future resource rents is excluded. Nor-
mally, future resource rents are discounted and the exploitation of the renewable resource is 
given a capital theoretical interpretation (see Clark and Munro, 1975). However, as in the case 
of steady-state, including discounting only means that the regulation changes over time. There-
fore, attention is restricted to long-run economic yield to keep the model as simple as possible. 
7  In this case type is indicated by subscript for the representative type. 
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8  See e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1993). From the maximisation problem it is obtained that F´(x) < 0 in optimum be-
cause the marginal stock costs are negative. Following Jensen and Vestergaard 
(2002b) RS can now be solved for x to yield   and because F´(x) 
< 0, x´(S) < 0. x´(S) can be interpreted as a biological response function and 
this function indicates how the steady-state stock responses to changes in ag-
gregated catches. We can substitute x = x(S) into the welfare function. Since we 
focus on the situation with only one representative agent it will be the case that 
) ( ) (
1 S x x F x = =
−
) ) 1 ( ( H L S S x x ν ν − + = . With respect to renewable resources we can distinguish be-
tween the cases summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Various types of renewable resources compared to standard case 









Renewable resources with stock-independent 
costs 










Renewable resources with stock-dependent costs 












In what follows a comparison between situations with and without resource re-
strictions is made. Given that the resource restriction is captured by x = x(S), 















 because F´(x) < 0 in optimum. However, for these 
resources two types exist. For some renewable resources the stock size does not 







. This would be the case for timber cut-









13ing that the stock size influences costs. This would be the case for hunting and 
groundwater (see Field, 2000).
9 
3.  Linear incentive scheme 
Now the implications of a linear incentive scheme are analysed (first in a static 
environment and in the next section the two-period situation). A linear incentive 
scheme is, as mentioned in section 2, defined as  θ θ bS a S R + = ) ( , where a is lump 
sum transfer and b is the performance dependent bonus. The profit for an agent 
of type θ given this reward scheme is by: 
 
) , , ( θ π θ θ θ x S C bS a − + = . 
 
For notational ease, let the cost function be  ) , , ( θ θ θ x S C C = . The first order condi-















= θ S = . Given the 
assumption on the cost function,  . As mentioned in section 2, the welfare 
function in the static situation under full information, when the principal faces 
an agent of type θ, is given by: 
H L S S >
 
) ( ) , , ( ) ( ) 1 ( θ θ θ θ θ θ λ θ λ π bS a x S C S p bS a S p W + − − ⋅ = + ⋅ + − ⋅ + = . 
 
The PC restriction will be binding under full information and implies that IR 
θ θ θ θ S b a x S C + = ) , , (
( ) 1 (
. Inserting this into the welfare function gives 
) , , θ λ θ x S θ C S p W + − ⋅ = . Maximizing with respect to b yields
10 
                                                           









corresponds to a schooling fishery (see Neher, 1990). 
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 (renewable resources with stock-




















. Comparing the two 
cases we have that for stock-dependent costs (hunting and groundwater), b is 
lower, which implies that S is smaller as well. Reducing S increase the size of 






] [ ] H H bS C − −λ
 
In the case where the agent is privately informed about type, the expected wel-
fare function reads: 
 
C S b p C S b p
bS a bS a W
H H L L
H H L L
λ ν λ ν
λ π ν λ π ν
− − − + − −
+ − − + + − =
) )[( 1 ( ] ) [(         
( )[ 1 ( )] ( [   (1) 
 
Maximizing of welfare implies that the PC constraint of the inefficient type is 
binding ( 0  =  H π  implying that  L H S b C a − = ).
12 To find b, insert this into equation 
(1): 
 
) )[( 1 ( ] ) [( H H L L C S b p C S b p W − − − + − − = λ ν λ ν . 
 













































































                                                           
11  The standard result i.e. found in Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985). 
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12  This also is a standard result that in a pricipal agent relationship, in order to maximize welfare, 





∂  and rearranging gives: 
 










































+ − λ λ λ (2) 
 




x ) we have 
] [ ] ) 1 ( ][ ) 1 ( [( H L












+ − λ λ . 
 
In this case,  0 ) 1 ( > + − b p λ . Under full information, we have that b = p/(1+λ). 
However, under private information this relationship does no longer hold. The 
intuition is that by raising the bonus, b, above the (shadow) price of output, the 
efficient agents surplus (or information rent) is increased, which is socially un-
desirably. On the other hand, inclusion of the resource constraint for stock-
dependent costs reduces b even further. Table 2 shows the value of b in the six 
cases. 
 


















S . Therefore, it follows that when we take 
into consideration the private information and the resource stock in the case of 
stock-dependent costs, the extraction levels are reduced two-fold. First, due to 
the private information and the well known fact that in order to reduce the in-
formation rent the effort to the inefficient agent must be reduced. Second, be-
cause of the resource constraint for stock-dependent costs. Note that for stock-








x ), the reward is equal to
 the reward in the 
standard case. The reason for this is that when costs are independent of stock 
size, welfare and profit are unaffected by this variable and, therefore, the same 
b as in the non-resource case is obtained. However, for renewable resources 
 








x ), the performance dependent-
bonus is lower because the stock size enters in the welfare and profit function. 
 
Table 2: The performance-dependent bonus in the relevant cases 
Resource  The value of the performance dependent bonus 
Non-resources and 
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The ratchet effect occurs due to the dependency between the belief the principal 
holds regarding type of agent in period one and the prospect of gaining in-
tertemporal rent. In order to analyse this in our setting, it is necessary to find 
how the information rents depend on b. In the private information setting, the 
 
17efficient type receives information rent. The reason is that the efficient type can 
always do better than the inefficient type. This combined with the participation 
constraint for the inefficient type, which implies that this type must be given 
non-negative profit, implies that the efficient type always gets a strict positive 
profit. At the extraction level for the inefficient agent, SH, the information rent 
is determined as the profit that the efficient type receives by choosing SH.
13 
Therefore, the information rent is determined as follows. Inserting the binding 
PC for type H into the profit function of type L,  ) , , ( L x S C S b a H H L − ⋅ + = π , yields 
) , , ( ) , , ( ) ( L x S C H x S C L H H L − = π . We are in particular interested in how the infor-
mation rent changes, as b changes. The result is given in Lemma 1. 
 






L L π . 
 
This follows from differentiation  ) (L L π with respect to b: 
 
. 0 ] ) ( ) [(















































































































L I . This holds for both 




C ) and renewable resources 









 in the three cases is 
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13  This follows from the fact that in optimum, the incentive compatibility constraint for the effi-




∂ ) ( π  
Type of resource  b
L L
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∂ ) ( π  is equal to 
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is the same in the standard case and stock-
independent costs. The reason for this result is that the stock size does not enter 







. For stock-dependent cost renewable 















. The main reason 
why under private information, b is lowered, is that the rent to the efficient type 
must be reduced. Since SH is increased,  ) ( H L H S C C −  also increased due to the 
single crossing property. The results are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
































In Figure 1 the performance dependent bonus in the standard case (and stock-
dependent costs) under private information is b1. The low cost agent extracts 
SL(b1), while the high stock agent extracts SH(b1). The low cost agent receives 
an information rent of kh. For renewable resources with stock-dependent costs 
the bonus is b2. SL(b2) is the efficient agents harvest, SH(b2) is the high cost 
agents harvest and cd is the information rent. SL, SH and the information rent are 
all lower for renewable resources with stock-dependent costs compared to non-
resources (and renewable resources with stock-independent costs). 
 
The result is not surprising, since in the general principal-agent model, the main 
reason to reduce the effort for the inefficient type is to reduce the information 




20Proposition 1:  A resource constraint for stock-dependent cost renewable re-
sources (hunting and groundwater) implies (1) extractions are 
decreased for both types compared to the standard case and 
renewable resources with stock-independent costs (timber 
cutting) and (2) the efficient type receives less information 
rent compared to the standard and stock-independent costs 
cases. 
 
The intuition of this proposition is as follow. The information rent is obtained 
since the low cost always can do better than the high cost type. In order to re-
duce the information rent, SH is reduced. However, the inclusion of the resource 
constraint reduces SH even further and so as a side effect also reduces the in-
formation rent to the efficient type. The main conclusion so far is that in a static 
situation, the information is less valuable for the efficient type. 
 
Note that the result that extraction for renewable resources with stock-
independent costs is reduced for both types is contrary to the result in Jensen 
and Vestergaard (2002a). In Jensen and Vestergaard (2002a) the extraction of 
the efficient type is increased. The differences in results arise because Jensen 
and Vestergaard (2002a) use a non-linear reward scheme, while a linear reward 
scheme is used in this paper. A non-linear reward scheme implies that more 
flexibility is allowed and, therefore, the extraction of the efficient type can be 
increased. However, the use of a non-linear incentive scheme may be ques-
tioned. A non-linear incentive scheme is from the point of view of practical 
contracting complex to use and because of this complexity the agents may mis-
understand the scheme. Therefore, non-linear schemes are sometimes approxi-
mated with linear schemes (see Laffont and Tirole (1993)). Thus, it is natural to 
use a linear scheme in this paper. 
4.  Continuation equilibrium, linear incentive scheme 
 
21
We now formulate a two-period version, t=1 and 2 where t is time, of the static 
model in section 3. In other words, a dynamic game between the principal and the representative agent is analysed. The agents now take into account how 
their actions in the first-period influence the inferences of the principal and, 
consequently, the prospect of gains in the second-period. One of the basic and 
important reasons for studying a ratchet effect is that the efficient type in a dy-
namic context might pool with an inefficient type.
14 The game has the following 
temporal structure. At the start of the first-period the principal chooses a 
scheme, (a1,b1), and a representative agent reacts to this scheme by extraction, 
S1, at first-period cost C1(S1,θ). The agent is rewarded by a1+b1S1, obtaining a 
first-period profit of  ) ( 1 θ π . At the start of the second-period the principal 
chooses a new scheme (a2,b2) and the representative agent chooses a second-
period extraction level, S2, given second-period cost on C2(S2,θ). The agent is 
rewarded with a2+b2S2 and obtains a second-period profit on  ) ( 2 θ π . Welfare in 
period 1 and period 2 is denoted W1 and W2, respectively. Let W=W1+W2 and 
) (θ π = ) ( 1 θ π + ) ( 2 θ π . 
 
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
The equilibrium concept applied in this paper is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
The perfection criterion here assumes that for any first-period incentive scheme, 
and for any strategies chosen in the first-period, the second-period strategies are 
chosen optimally conditioned on first-period behaviour and based on Bayesian 
updating. This allows us to focus on first-period interactions as second-period 
actions are predetermined on the basis of first-period behaviour. 
 
The set of players consists of nature, N, the principal and the representative 
agent. Let ht denote the history of the game at the beginning of period t, i.e., the 
vector of actions up to period t. Allowing for mixed strategies, we let the strate-
gies for the principal and the agent be a sequence of schemes, 
{(a1(v1),b1(v1)),(a2(h2),b2(h2))}, and extractions, {S1(a1,b1,θ),(S2(h2,a2,b2,θ)}, re-
spectively. The system of beliefs is denoted µ=(v1,v2(h2)) with v1=P(L) being a 
prior probability that the agent has low costs, and v2=P(L| h2) is the posterior 
beliefs that costs are low defined as via Bayes rule. 
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14  Note that subscripts in the dynamic settings indicate time periods. As mentioned above we look for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium to this game, 
i.e., for a set of strategies, {(a1,b1) ,  , (a
* *
1 1 ) , ( θ b S 2,b2)
*, S2
*}, and a system of be-
liefs satisfying: 
 
P1  . 
2 *
2 2 max arg : } , { π θ S S H L = ∈ ∀




2 2 2 W h v W h v b a S b a − + =
P3 Given  (  and   and for all 
*
2 2 ) ,b a
*
2 S } , { H L ∈ θ :   1
*
1 1 1 max arg ) , ( π θ S b S ∈
P4 Given  S , S  and (  
*




2 2 ) ,b a 1 } , {
*
1 1 1 1 max arg ) , ( : W b a b a ∈
B   v2(h2) is Bayes-consistent with v1 and the firms first-period strategy  ) ( 1 θ S  
and observed actions. 
 
P1 implies profit maximization of the representative agent and states that for 
any history of the game, and any second-period incentive scheme, both types 
simply maximize their static profit. P2 requires that the principal offers an in-
centive system, (a2,b2) , that maximizes second-period welfare for any history 
of the play incorporated in the posterior beliefs, v
*
2(h2). P3 implies first-period 
profit maximization of the representative agent, now also taking into account 
the second-period incentive scheme and second-period harvest. P4 requires that 
the principal offers an incentive system, (a1,b1)
*, that maximizes first-period 
welfare taking into account the second-period incentive scheme and second-
period harvest. Finally, B implies that updating of beliefs is consistent with 
Bayes rule (when possible). 
 
The Perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept builds on a backward induction ar-
gument. Hence, the right framework is to consider the second-period first. For 
the second-period, we define a continuation equilibrium, which is a set of sec-
ond-period strategies with an updating rule satisfying P1, P2, P4 and B for an 
exogenous given first-period incentive scheme. For a given probability, v2(h2), 
conditional upon the observed choice in the first-period of the representative 
agent, (h2), the second-period incentive scheme is the optimal static incentive 
scheme for belief v2(h2). The second-period incentive scheme yields no rent for 
the inefficient type and rent, I(v2), for the efficient type. 
 
23Let the scheme, (a1,b1), where a1 is such that the PC constraint of both types is 
satisfied, be given. In any continuation equilibrium we must have the following 
structure: 
 
(a)   S(a1,b1;H) =S(b1,H) 
(b)   S(a1,b1;L) ={S(b1,L), S(b1,H)} 
 
(a) and (b) state that an inefficient type will choose its static optimal effort 
level, S(b1,H), while an efficient type will either also play its own static optimal 
effort level, S(b1,L), or else pool with the inefficient type at S(b1,H). No other 
strategies satisfy the above conditions. 
 
Now it is clear that: (i) Whatever the principals beliefs, v2, and, thereby, what-
ever action in the first-period for the efficient type, the principal will set a2 such 
that the second-period profit for an efficient type is zero. It is, then, optimal for 
an efficient type to take the first-period action, S(b1,H). (ii) Given (i), if any 
other harvest than S(b1,H) is observed, the principal can perfectly infer that 
costs are low, and set a2 such that second-period profits are zero. Hence, it is 
optimal for the low cost type to play its static maximizing level S(b1,L). 
 
Define  ) , ( θ π v t  as the profit for agent of type θ in period t, when the principal 
holds beliefs v that costs are low. One of the basic facts for a ratchet effect is 
summarised in lemma 2. 
 
Lemma 2:  ) , ( L v t π  is continuously and decreasing in v.
15 
 
This means that an efficient agent’s information rent is increasing in the belief 
that the agent is inefficient. The reason for this is that the principal most bal-
ance the costs of reducing harvest for the inefficient type and the saved infor-
mation rent for the efficient type. The higher the belief that the agent is ineffi-
cient, the more weight is optimally put on the negative effect of reducing the 
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15  See e.g. Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985). harvest of the inefficient agent, and, hence, optimal to accept more information 
rent. 
 
Hence, given a two-period relationship, the principal might worry about an effi-
cient type having strong incentive to pool with an inefficient type. In order to 
analyse this, we have to compare the cost from concealing information in pe-
riod 1 for type L with the gain of concealment to this type. The cost for the effi-
cient type in period 1 of concealing information, which is found when a low 
cost type chooses the harvest level that is optimal for a high cost type in a static 
situation, is: 
 
)] ( ) ( [ ] [ ) ( 1 1 L L H L L H S C S C S S b b − − − = ∆ . 
 
The term in the first bracket on the right hand side is the costs of foregone out-
put in period 1 and the term in the second bracket is the saved cost of output. 
 
It is important to evaluate how the cost of concealment is influenced by changes 
in b1. 
 







b  in the standard case and renewable resources with 






























b  also holds for stock-dependent cost renewable re-
sources. 
 









































































































































− + −  
 
25For all three cases, the first term is positive and the second term is zero because 
the expression in the bracket is the first order condition for the representative 
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 for these two cases. With respect to stock-
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∂  , is low 








for renewable resources with stock-dependent costs. The results are summarised 
in Table 4. 
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26From Table 4 it is seen that 
1
1




 is smaller for resources with stock-
dependent costs than for stock-independent costs renewable resources. Renew-
able resources with stock-independent costs yield the same result as non-
resources because stock size does not enter the welfare and profit functions for 
these resources. 
 
Let the gain of concealment for the low cost type, which occurs in the second-
period, be denoted ) , ( 2 L v π . Given lemma 2, the smaller v, the higher the gain to 
an efficient type from concealing its type. Hence, the maximum second-period 






For any given b1:
17 
 
1) There exists a unique pooling continuation equilibrium iff b1 is 
such that 
      ) , ( ) ( 1 2 1 L v b π ≤ ∆ . 
2) There exists a unique separating continuation equilibrium iff b1 
is such that 
      ) , 0 ( ) ( 2 1 L b π ≥ ∆ . 
3) There exists a unique semi-separating continuation equilibrium 
iff b1 is such that 
    ) , 0 ( ) ( ) , ( 2 1 1 2 L b L v π π < ∆ < . 
 
First look at 2). Here the cost of concealment is so high, that even in the case 
where the principal believes that costs are truly high (in which case the second-
period gain is  ) , 0 ( 2 L π , and, hence, the benefits from concealment are maxi-
mized), it is not profitable for an efficient type to pool with the inefficient 
                                                           
16  We only need to verify the existence of these types of equilibrium, since what we are interested 
in is how these conditions change as b changes. 
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17  See Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985) for a proof of this. Note that a1 is such that the IR 
constraints of both types are satisfied. type.
18 Next turn attention to 1). In a pooling equilibrium, no new information is 
revealed, and  1 1 )) , ( ( v L b h = ν . A pooling equilibrium exists when it is beneficial 
for the efficient type to pool even when prior beliefs remain unchanged. In 3) it 
is optimal for the efficient type to randomize between SL and SH since it is not 
beneficial for an efficient type to pool given unchanged type, but to do so if the 
regulator would believe costs were high as shown in figure 2. 
) ( 1 ν
                             
 
We will now analyse the implications of the ratchet effect on the optimal struc-
ture of the incentive schemes in a fully dynamic context. So far we have shown 
the existence of a unique continuation equilibrium for a given first-period 
scheme and now we focus on a characterization of the optimal first-period re-
ward scheme. A full characterization of the optimal first-period scheme in the 
case without resource constraint can be found in Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole 
(1985). The intuition in this standard setting is that if the regulator in the in-
tertemporal setting by choosing  ) ( 1 ν b  (the optimal static incentive) the induced 
continuation equilibrium is separating, then  ) ( 1 ν b  is also optimal in this dynamic 
setting. However, if b  induces pooling, then it is optimal to raise b above 
) ( 1 ν b , the reason is that pooling will always be at the inefficient type’s harvest 
level, and increasing b will therefore increase the output of both, which is opti-
mal. 
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18  Suppose the unique equilibrium is separating. From (a) and (b), page 15, it follows that the two 
types in period one play their optimal static strategies. This implies that  0 )) , ( ), , (( 1 1 1 2 = H b S b a v  
and  1 )) , ( ), , (( 1 1 1 2 = L b S b a v . As this equilibrium is separating the gain of concealment ) , 0 ( 2 L δπ , 
cannot exceed the loss  . Conversely, suppose that (2) holds. For any out-of-equilibrium 
strategy S1 ∉{S(b1,L), S(b1,H)}, choose again v2=1. This together with the fact that (2) holds 
induces the low type to play S1=S(b1,L). 
) 1 b ( ∆Figure 2: Pooling, semi-separating and separating equilibria as a function of 
b1
19 
) ( 1 b ∆  
1 b  
) , ( L ν π  
) , 0 ( L π  
P  SS S
 
In this paper we focus on the implications of including a resource constraint for 
both stock-dependent and stock-independent renewable resources. The focus of 
our analysis is whether the inclusion of the resource constraint alters the result 
that increasing b above  ) ( 1 ν b  increases welfare. This is relevant because of the 
stock externality effect which implies that increasing b reduces the stock and 
hence increases the harvest. 
 
Define  as the optimal dynamic first-period b, and let 
D b1 ) ( 1 ν b  be the static opti-
mal b1, given prior beliefs  1 ν . First, we derive a lower bound for  . This is 
done by considering the welfare effects of increasing b
D b1
1 in case where b =
D
1 ) ( 1 ν b  
implies pooling. Next we show that no b <
D
1 ) ( 1 ν b  is optimal. The intertemporal 
welfare given pooling in the first-period, denoted W , and hence, the sec-
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19  Figure reproduced from Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985). P stands for pooling, SS for 
semi-separation and S for separation, and follow immediate from lemma 4. ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 H H H L H H
P S C S C S b a S p b W ⋅ − − ⋅ − + ⋅ − ⋅ = ν ν λ  
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stock-independent costs) W  still increases with b ( 1 b
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∂  is inconclusive.  
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b . The third part is 
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∂  is 
inconclusive. These results is summarised in Table 5. 
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∂ cannot be determined because the first term is positive while the second 
term is negative. In the standard case and renewable resources with stock-







∂ is positive. This result arises because the 






son for this is as follows. In a situation without a resource restriction (the stan-
dard case) where the continuation equilibrium implies pooling, the optimal dy-
namic first-period b1 is optimally increased above the static optimal b . This 
happens because we know from lemma 1 that the principal induces the ineffi-
cient type to choose an inefficiently low level of harvest. However, if an effi-
cient type pools with an inefficient type, the output of a low cost type will be 
inefficient as well. In order to mitigate this latter effect incentive must opti-




31independent costs because profit and welfare are not affected by the stock size. 
However, for renewable resources with stock-dependent costs (hunting and 
groundwater) the resource constraint points in the other direction, since increas-
ing b1, increases the costs through its effect on the stock, and in case of pooling 
at  ) ( 1 ν b  it is no longer clear that it is optimal to increase b1 above  ) ( 1 ν b
b ∆
) , ( 2 L v
. 




From lemma 5 we cannot immediately decide whether it is possible to have 
 in a pooling equilibrium. It is, however, possible to show that this 
cannot be the case. In order to show this, consider a situation where we have 
that   and where this implies pooling. Let us analyse the effect on wel-
fare when b
) 1 1 v b
D
b < ) ( 1 1 v
1 is increased. We decompose the effect on welfare into two parts. 
The first effect comes for increasing b1, but for unchanged probability of revela-
tion of the low cost type. Increasing b1 increases the harvest for both types. 
Since the harvest for both types at b is smaller than in the static opti-
mum, this clearly increases welfare. The second effect stems from changes in 
the probability of revelation due to increases in b
) ( 1 1 1 v b
D <
1. We know that  , the cost 
of concealment, is increasing in b
1
1. Moreover, we note that π  only de-
pends on b1 through v. For any b1 that implies pooling, the optimal second-
period incentive scheme is the same, and for any b1 that implies separation, the 
second-period is the optimal static incentive scheme. Therefore, the gain in pe-
riod 2 is unaffected by b1. From lemma 4 it follows that the probability of reve-
lation increases due to increases in b1.  Furthermore, it is shown in Freixas, 
Guesnerie and Tirole (1985) that welfare is increasing in number of revealing 
firms.
20 Finally, we need to show that b  if   induces a separating con-
tinuation equilibrium. However, the only reason why b
) 1 ( 1 1 v b
D =
D b1
1 is optimally distorted 
from second best optimum (b ), is when there is a second-period gain in 
terms of better information, but since all information already is revealed at 
) ( 1 1 v
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20  For the firms that switch from pooling in the reference situation to revealing second-period 
social welfare is increased since the second-period scheme is now the full information scheme. 
For the pooling firms, the regulator can always duplicate his previous second-period incom-
plete information scheme in the reference situation (which is now sub-optimal) and leave social 
welfare unaffected. ) ( 1 1 v b  this is also an intertemporal optimal choice. These results are summarized 
in lemma 6. 
) (v = π
 




In order to fully characterize how the inclusion of a resource constraint affects 
the contracting possibilities, we need to derive how the second-period gain from 
concealment is affected by changes in b1. The second-period gain is given by: 
 
) ( ) ( ,x S C S v b a L L L − + . 
 
Inserting that   yields  0 )) ( ( = v b
H π ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , , x S C x S C S v b S v b v L L H H H L − + − = π . Differ-
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For the standard case and renewable resources with stock-independent costs 






H L S S
v b
ν π . However, for stock-dependent costs re-



































ν π . The situations are sketched 






For renewable resources with stock-dependent costs (hunting and 
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Table 6 shows that non-resources and resources with stock-independent costs 













∂ ν π  may be lower or larger for resources with stock-dependent cost renew-
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π δ  is equal to 
Standard case and case with renewable re-
sources with stock-independent costs 
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Given the resource constraint for stock-dependent cost renewable resources 
(hunting and groundwater), b  is lowered. A smaller   implies, given  ) ( 1 v ) ( 1 v b
 
34lemma 3, that ∆  is smaller as well. Therefore, the cost of concealment is smal-
ler. Moreover, from lemma 5, we know that if the two types pool at b  in the 
dynamic setting, then the incentives of the principal to eliminate pooling via 
increasing b
1 b
) ( 1 v
1 are smaller. Since the gain from concealment can go both ways 














b ) ( 1 v  
 
Situation 1:  0
)
)
> . Here second-period rent from pooling is smaller, and, 
hence, incentives to pool smaller, given that the principal sticks to   in pe-
riod two as well. This situation is reproduced in Figure 3a, where S
-RC (S
+RC) 
indicates the set of b1 that implies a separating continuation equilibrium in the 
non-resource case and the case of stock-independent cost resources (timber cut-
ting). For a low cost agent in the case of renewable resources with stock-
dependent costs (hunting and groundwater), second-period rent from pooling is 
smaller, but the cost of concealment is smaller as well. Therefore, nothing deci-
sive about the effect of the resource constraint in these resources can be stated. 
In Figure 3a, we have presented a situation where the inclusion of a resource 
constraint does not alter to incentives to pool. However, if pooling would occur 
at  , then the incentives for the principal to increase b ) ( 1 v b 1 in order to separate 
the types are reduced. 
 
 
















ν π  
) ( 1 b ∆
1 b
) , ( L ν δπ  
) , 0 ( L
RC − δπ   S
-RC
) ( 1 1 v b
RC −   ) ( 1 1 v
RC +  
) , 0 ( L
RC + δπ   S
+RC
) ( 1 b ∆
1 b
) , ( L
RC ν δπ
−
) , 0 ( L
RC − δπ S
-RC
1 b
RC − ) ( 1 1 v b
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ν π . Here second-period rent from pooling is larger and the 
incentives to pool are larger, given that the principal sticks to b . Together 
with the fact that smaller   implies that 
) ( 1 v
) ( 1 v b 1 b ∆  is smaller as well, undisputable 
increasing the incentives for a low cost type to pool. 
 
Figure 3b shows an example where inclusion of a resource constraint for re-
newable resources with stock-dependent costs (hunting and groundwater) 
switches the incentives for the low cost type from separating to full pooling. 
Moreover, if types pool at b  in the dynamic setting, then the principal’s in-
centive to eliminate pooling via increasing b
) ( 1 v
1 is smaller. 
 
These considerations can be summarized in the following way: 
 
Proposition 2:  The ratchet effect can either be enhanced or weakened by the 
presence of a resource constraint for stock-dependent cost re-
sources 
 
Finally, we can make some static comparative calculation of the effect of the 
resource constraint on the effect on the reduction in b  in situation one (fol-
lows from (2)): b  is smaller: 1) the larger 
) ( 1 v








∂ θ  for re-
newable resources with stock-dependent costs (hunting and groundwater). 
Since a smaller  , implies a smaller cost of concealment, this is to say that 
when 










are large (large stock externality) , then   is reduced more 
and the cost of concealment is also smaller, in which case the likelihood of 
pooling at   is increased. 
) ( 1 v b
( 1 v b
5.  Conclusion 
 
36
Laffont and Tirole (1993) show that if the principal could commit not to change 
the incentive contract in case of new information, it would be optimal to use a static second best contract in each period. As already noted in the introduction, 
long-run commitment is no option for most renewable resources, and, therefore, 
the effect of the ratchet effect cannot be avoided. In this case, the appropriate-
ness of using these incentive schemes must be evaluated. Since the static sec-
ond-best contract implies full separation, we can interpret the level of pooling 
as a measure for the inefficiency short-term contracting implies. More pooling 
implies more severe implication on welfare. This argument follows Milgrom 
and Roberts (1992) who show that to the extend that information lowers the 
variance with which second-period performance is measured (lowers the princi-
pals uncertainty about the type of the agent) information increases welfare. 
Since our results basically show that the level of pooling in a renewable re-
source contracting problem can be higher or lower, depending on parameter 
values and type of renewable problem at hand, the conclusion of our analysis is 
that the negative welfare effect of the ratchet effect might be more or less se-
vere compared to situations without resource constraint. 
 
However, we can still conclude that since the ratchet effect is prevailing in con-
tracting for renewable resources, and that the presence of the ratchet effect 
might have serious consequences for the prospect of revealing information. 
Hence, if a main reason for applying information revealing mechanism is to re-
veal information, our result is bad news for this type of regulation. Jensen and 
Vestergaard (2002a) argue that the advantages of using an information reveal-
ing instrument in renewable resource contracting lay in the revelation of infor-
mation itself. For many renewable resources cost data are not collected. For 
those resources where information on costs is collected the data are often based 
on statements by the extractors. If the extractor receives a subsidy on the basis 
of the stated costs and if the true cost type of the agent is unobservable, it is 
possible that the high cost agent pretends to be a low cost agent because it can 
increase its total subsidy by doing so. It must now be in the interest of the prin-
cipal to design the tax mechanism such that the agents get an incentive to reveal 
the type correctly and, hence, incentive compatibility restrictions are included. 
Valuable information is, therefore, collected, but the price of collecting this in-
formation is that an information rent must be paid. 
 
37Regulation is complex and might lead to unexpected incentives. We have cho-
sen to stick to a linear incentive scheme. The main reason for this is that it is the 
most realistic approach, since each agent will face the same contract. However, 
such a scheme is not without shortcomings (see Zou (1989)). Linear incentive 
schemes yield lower social value than piecewise linear schemes. By including 
non-linear incentive schemes, it is shown in Laffont and Tirole (1993) that the 
type of pooling which arises from linear incentive schemes can be eliminated. 
However, another type of incentives arises with non-linear schemes. If we use a 
non-linear incentive scheme, a dynamic interaction set-up can result in “take-
the-money-and-run” behaviour. This is caused by the problem that in order to 
get an efficient type to reveal itself, one might use a high-powered incentive 
scheme, that this also attracts the inefficient type. In the second-period, the 
principal is now convinced that the agent is efficient, which causes an ineffi-
cient type to leave the industry. Such incentives might be especially severe in 
exploitation of renewable resources. 
 
Since this paper is the first to deal with the presence of the ratchet effects in dy-
namic contracting for renewable resources under asymmetric information, our 
analysis points to the need for further research of the effect of the contracting 
instruments. In particular, it must be analysed how different instruments yield 
different incentive in a dynamic context and in this respect conclusions about 
the relative merits of different instruments must be reached. Such conclusions 
are arrived at in Jensen and Vestergaard (2002a), but only in a static context. 
 
386.  References 
[1]  Clark, C. and G. Munro (1975). Economics of Fishing and Modern Capital 
Theory: A Simplified Approach, Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 2, 91-106. 
 
[2]  Conrad, J.M. and C.W. Clark (1987). Natural Resource Economics. Notes 
and Problems, Cambridge University Press. 
 
[3]  Clark, C.W. (1990). Matematical Bioeconomics. The Optimal Manage-
ment of Renewable Resources, John Wiley and Sons. 
 
[4]  Dillén, M. and M. Lundholm (1996). ’Dynamic Income Taxation, Redis-
tribution and the Ratchet Effect’, Journal of Public Economics, 59, 69-93. 
 
[5] Field, B.C. (2000). Natural  Resource Economics – An introduction, 
McGraw Hill. 
 
[6]  Freixas, D., R. Guesnerie and J. Tirole (1985). ‘Planning under Incomplete 
Information and the Ratchet Effect’, Review of Economic Studies, 52, 173-
192. 
 
[7]  Hanley, N.J., J.F. Shogren and B. White (1997). Environmental Economics 
in Theory and Practice, Macmillan. 
 
[8]  Jensen, F. and N. Vestergaard (2002a). A Principal-Agent Analysis of 
Fisheries, Journal of Institutional and Theoretic Economics, 158, 276-285. 
 
[9]  Jensen, F. and N. Vestergaard (2002b). Moral Hazard Problems in Fisher-
ies Regulations: The Case of Illegal Landings and Discards, Resource and 
Energy Economics, 24, 281-299. 
 
 
39[10] Laffont, J-J. and J. Tirole (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement 
and Regulation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
[11]  Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1992). Economics, Organisation and Man-
agement, Prentice Hall. 
 
[12] Neher, P.A. (1990). Natural Resource Economics, Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
[13] Ortmann, A. and R. Squire (2000). ’A Game-Theoretic Explanation of the 
Administrative Lattice in Institutions of Higher learning’, Journal of Eco-
nomic Behaviour and Organisations, 43, 377-391. 
 
[14] Sandal, L.K. and S.I. Steinshamn (1997). A Feedback Model for the Opti-
mal Management of Renewable Natural Capital Stocks, Canadian Journal 
of Fisheries and Aquatic Science, 54, 2475-2482. 
 
[15] Zou, L. (1989). Target Incentive System vs. Price Incentive System under 
Adverse Selection and Ratchet Effect, Mimeo, Tilburg University.
 
40Department of Environmental and Business Economics 
Institut for Miljø- og Erhvervsøkonomi (IME) 
 
 





Issued working papers from IME 
Udgivne arbejdspapirer fra IME 
No.    
1/99  Frank Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Hans Frost 
Asymmetrisk information og regulering af 
forurening 
2/99 Finn  Olesen  Monetær integration i EU 
3/99 Frank  Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Regulation of Renewable Resources in Fed-
eral Systems: The Case of Fishery in the EU 
4/99 Villy  Søgaard  The Development of Organic Farming in 
Europe 
5/99 Teit  Lüthje 
Finn Olesen 
EU som handelsskabende faktor? 
6/99  Carsten Lynge Jensen  A Critical Review of the Common Fisheries 
Policy 
7/00  Carsten Lynge Jensen  Output Substitution in a Regulated Fishery 
8/00 Finn  Olesen  Jørgen Henrik Gelting – En betydende dansk 
keynesianer 
9/00 Frank  Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Moral Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regula-
tion: The Case of Illegal Landings 
10/00 Finn  Olesen  Moral, etik og økonomi 
11/00 Birgit  Nahrstedt  Legal Aspect of Border Commuting in the 
Danish-German Border Region 
12/00 Finn  Olesen  Om Økonomi, matematik og videnskabelighed 
- et bud på provokation 
 
4113/00  Finn Olesen 
Jørgen Drud Hansen 
European Integration: Some stylised facts 
14/01  Lone Grønbæk  Fishery Economics and Game Theory 
15/01  Finn Olesen  Jørgen Pedersen on fiscal policy - A note 
16/01  Frank Jensen  A Critical Review of the Fisheries Policy: 
Total Allowable Catches and Rations for 
Cod in the North Sea 
17/01  Urs Steiner Brandt  Are uniform solutions focal? The case of 
international environmental agreements 
18/01  Urs Steiner Brandt  Group Uniform Solutions 
19/01  Frank Jensen  Prices versus Quantities for Common Pool 
Resources 
20/01  Urs Steiner Brandt  Uniform Reductions are not that Bad 
21/01  Finn Olesen 
Frank Jensen 
A note on Marx 
22/01  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Hot air in Kyoto, cold air in The Hague 
23/01  Finn Olesen  Den marginalistiske revolution: En dansk 
spire der ikke slog rod? 
24/01  Tommy Poulsen  Skattekonkurrence og EU's skattestruktur 
25/01  Knud Sinding  Environmental Management Systems as 
Sources of Competitive Advantage 
26/01  Finn Olesen  On Machinery. Tog Ricardo fejl? 
27/01  Finn Olesen  Ernst Brandes: Samfundsspørgsmaal - en 
kritik af Malthus og Ricardo 
28/01  Henrik Herlau 
Helge Tetzschner 
Securing Knowledge Assets in the Early 
Phase of Innovation 
29/02  Finn Olesen  Økonomisk teorihistorie 
Overflødig information eller brugbar bal-
last? 
30/02  Finn Olesen  Om god økonomisk metode 
– beskrivelse af et lukket eller et åbent so-
cialt system? 
31/02  Lone Grønbæk Kronbak  The Dynamics of an Open Access: The case 
of the Baltic Sea Cod Fishery - A Strategic 
Approach - 
 
4232/02  Niels Vestergaard 
Dale Squires 
Frank Jensen 
Jesper Levring Andersen 
Technical Efficiency of the Danish Trawl 
fleet: Are the Industrial Vessels Better 
Than Others? 
33/02  Birgit Nahrstedt 
Henning P. Jørgensen 
Ayoe Hoff 
Estimation of Production Functions on 
Fishery: A Danish Survey 
34/02  Hans Jørgen Skriver  Organisationskulturens betydning for vi-
densdelingen mellem daginstitutionsledere 
i Varde Kommune 
35/02  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Rent-seeking and grandfathering: The case 
of GHG trade in the EU 
36/02  Philip Peck 
Knud Sinding 
Environmental and Social Disclosure and 
Data-Richness in the Mining Industry 
37/03  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Fighting windmills? EU industrial interests 
and global climate negotiations 
38/03  Finn Olesen  Ivar Jantzen – ingeniøren, som beskæftige-
de sig med økonomi 
39/03  Finn Olesen  Jens Warming: den miskendte økonom 
40/03  Urs Steiner Brandt  Unilateral actions, the case of interna-
tional environmental problems 
41/03  Finn Olesen  Isi Grünbaum: den politiske økonom 
42/03  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Hot Air as an Implicit Side Payment Ar-
rangement: Could a Hot Air Provision 






Application of the Inverse Almost Ideal 
Demand System to Welfare Analysis 
44/03  Finn Olesen  Rudolf Christiani – en interessant rigs-
dagsmand? 
45/03  Finn Olesen  Kjeld Philip – en økonom som også blev 
politiker 
46/03  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Bureaucratic Rent-Seeking in the European 
Union 





48/03  Eva Roth 
Susanne Jensen 
Impact of recreational fishery on the for-
mal Danish economy 
49/03  Helge Tetzschner 
Henrik Herlau 
Innovation and social entrepreneurship in 
tourism - A potential for local business de-
velopment? 
50/03  Lone Grønbæk Kronbak 
Marko Lindroos 
An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fisher-
men and Authorities forming Coalitions 
51/03  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
The Political Economy of Climate Change 
Policy in the EU: Auction and Grand-
fathering 
52/03  Tipparat Pongthana-
panich 
Review of Mathematical Programming for 
Coastal Land Use Optimization 
53/04  Max Nielsen 
Frank Jensen 
Eva Roth 
A Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Public Label-
ling Scheme of Fish Quality 
54/04  Frank Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Fisheries Management with Multiple Mar-
ket Failures 
55/04  Lone Grønbæk Kronbak  A Coalition Game of the Baltic Sea Cod 
Fishery 
56/04  Bodil Stilling Blichfeldt  Approaches of Fast Moving Consumer 
Good Brand Manufacturers Product De-
velopment 
“Safe players” versus “Productors”: Im-
plications for Retailers’ Management of 
Manufacturer Relations 
57/04  Svend Ole Madsen 
Ole Stegmann Mikkelsen 
Interactions between HQ and divisions in a 
MNC 
- Some consequences of IT implementation 
on organizing supply activities 
 
58/04  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Frank Jensen 
Lars Gårn Hansen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Ratcheting in Renewable Resources Con-
tracting 
 
 